Causation means that where a consequence must be proved then the prosecution must show that D caused that consequence. Put simply, it allows the defendant to be convicted when the consequence was his fault, and to be acquitted when it is not his fault. Causation is tested in two ways, causation in fact and causation in law. Also, there must also be no break in the chain of causation or a novus actus interveniens.
Factual Causation
In factual causation defendant can only be guiloty if the consequence would not have happened ‘but for’ his conduct. If the consequence would have occurred anyway, the defendant will be found not guilty.
An example of this is in R v White, when he poisoned his
mother’s lemonade, but before it could take affect, she had a heart attack and
died. The ‘but for’ test demonstrate that, but for the sons actions of
poisoning the drink, would his mother of died anyway. As the answer is yes and
the but for test is not satisfied the son will be not guilty of his mothers
death.
Both factual and legal causation must be satisfied to
sustain a conviction. If one foes not satisfy then D can not be convicted. In
the case of R v Pagget, he kidnapped his ex girlfriend before being pursued by
police. In a shootout he used the girl as a shield where she was shot and died.
But for him not using her as a shield and shooting at police she would not have
been shot. D was convicted.
Legal Causation
There may be more than one person whose act may have contributed
to the prohibited consequence. Where this is the case D can still be convicted
even though his conduct was not the only cause provided that his conduct was
more than minimal, or made a significant contribution to the consequence. To
summarise, the rule is that the defendant’s conduct must be more than a minimal
cause, but it needs not to be a substantial cause. This is known as the De
minimus test.
The case of R v Pagett can be used in this circumstance but
the Harlot’s case will be the example. In the Harlots case a woman left her
newborn baby under some leaves as she went to work, when she returned the baby
had been attacked and died. As she was a relation to the baby and made an
omission not looking after her, she was convicted for murder.
Novus Actus Intervenies
There must be a direct link from the defendants conduct to
the prohibited consequence. This is known as the chain of causation. In some
situations there may be more than one act or omission which leads to the
prohibited consequence.
Where there are several causes, the question which must be
answered is ‘whether the defendants act was a ‘substantial cause’ or ‘merely
part of the history’. For example, does the new and intervening act break the
chain of responsibility between D and V?
The chain of causation may be broken by a novus actus
intervenies (a new act intervening) but only if this new act was so unlikely or
‘so daft’ that it could not reasonably have been foreseen. In the case of R v
Robertson, a man took a woman to a remote place, making sexual advance to her.
When rejected by her, he sped away where she then decided to jump out of the
moving car suffering concussion, cuts and bruises. Where the
victim's actions were a natural result of the defendant's actions it matters
not whether the defendant could foresee the result. Only where the victim’s
actions were so daft or unexpected that no reasonable man could have expected
it would there be a break in the chain of causation.
In the case of R v Marjoram, the defendant inflicted grievous
bodily harm by forcing his way into 16 year old Jennifer Bluett's room on the
third floor room in a hostel, causing her to jump in fear to the ground through
the window, receiving life-threatening injuries. D was guilty if such an
outcome was foreseeable by a reasonable person in D's position whether or not D
had actually foreseen it. The reasonable man did not have to be the same sex
and age as the defendant although in this case he was the same age.
Only very rare will medical treatment (even bad treatment) break the chain of causation. However In the case of Bush v Kentucky the chain was broken. Bush shot a woman, who recovered after going to hospital, however catching scarlet fever of the doctor and died. As catching the disease was unforeseeable, no one could have been charged with her murder. However, usually medical treatment will hardly ever break the chain of causation. In R v Cheshire, he defendant shot a man in the stomach and thigh. The hospital gave him a tracheotomy. Several weeks later his wounds were healing and no longer life threatening, however, he continued to have breathing difficulty and died from complications arising from the tracheotomy. The defendant was convicted of murder and appealed. His conviction was upheld despite the fact that the wounds were not the operative cause of death.
The Egg Shell Skull Rule
The fact that the victim may be particularly susceptible in some way is irrelevant. According to the so-called ‘eggshell skull rule’ those who use violence must take their victims as they find them.
In R v Woods the defendant had been left in charge of his
younger brothers and sisters while their father was away at war, but the father
had recently returned. One day D struck his younger brother B for being cheeky;
B got up and walked out of the room, but soon afterwards collapsed and died
because of a very rare and unsuspected thymus condition making him highly
susceptible to any sudden shock. The judge directed the jury that he would be
guilty if D had struck an unlawful blow, even though it would have caused no
serious harm to any healthy person.
R v Blaue The defendant stabbed an 18 year old girl
four times when she refused to have sexual intercourse with him. She was a
practising Jehovah's Witness and refused to have a blood transfusion which
would have saved her life. The defendant was convicted of manslaughter on the
grounds of diminished responsibility and appealed arguing that the girl's
refusal to accept the blood transfusion was a novus actus interveniens breaking
the chain of causation, alternatively that Holland was no longer good law. The
defendant's conviction was upheld. The wound was still an operative cause of
death so no novus actus interveniens
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